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Mocking George:
Political Satire as "True Threat"
in the Age of Global Terrorism
LAUREN GILBERT*
0, you are sick of self-love, Malvolio, and taste with a distempered
appetite. To be generous, guiltless and of free disposition, is to take
those things for bird bolts that you deem cannon bullets. There is no
slander in an allowed fool, though he do nothing but rail; nor no railing
in a known discreet man, thou he do nothing but reprove.'
One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criti-
cize public men and measures - and that means not only informed and
responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without
moderation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Political satire is under attack in America. Since this country
launched its war against global terrorism in September 2001, those who
mock the President, his Administration, and even family members of
high-ranking officials have come under assault from both government
and non-state actors. "Men in Black" have shown up unannounced at
the homes and places of business of persons perceived to be un-Ameri-
can or a threat to the President. Satirical speech, particularly speech that
takes the form of attacks on the President or other high-ranking govern-
ment officials, appears to be withering under the recent onslaught. Fur-
thermore, surveys show that in 2002, the American public grew
increasingly intolerant of dissent, including political humor that they
considered offensive.
First Amendment scholars have expressed grave concern that lower
federal courts have ignored the speech-protective language in Watts v.
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; Harvard University,
B.A. magna cum laude (1983); University of Michigan School of Law, J.D. cum laude (1988). I
would like to thank my Research Assistants, Stephanie Cisneros, and Brian Petrano, and my
colleagues at St. Thomas Law School, especially Professor Lenora Ledwon and Associate
Professor Elizabeth Pendo, for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT, Art. 1, Scene V, lines 92-98.
2. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944).
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United States3 and Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 companion Supreme Court
cases in 1969 that established, respectively, the "true threat" doctrine
and the "clear and present danger" test. Of particular concern are the
"reasonable person" tests juries are instructed to apply in determining
whether certain speech rises to the level of a true threat. Scholars argue
for a subjective standard based on the actual intent of the speaker5 and
criticize courts for allowing juries to decide whether certain speech is
protected.6 They argue that this is a question of law or "constitutional
fact" for the judge to decide. Current intolerance of dissent and offen-
sive humor, the argument goes, only underscores that giving juries -
who often mirror popular views - greater decisional power in free
speech cases would deal the First Amendment "a crippling blow."7
This Article examines the First Amendment implications of recent
investigations undertaken by the federal government against persons
engaged in satirical speech. It explores the democratizing and corrective
function that political satire and parody historically have played in
American politics. Governmental abuse of power under federal threat
statutes is then explored, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 876, and 879,
which stifle satirical speech that takes the form of attacks on the Presi-
dent. This Article looks at various incidents in the context of the erosion
of the "true threat" doctrine by lower federal courts, and then examines
the implications of the Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Black,8
which appears to have restored the speech-protective aspects of that doc-
trine. The Article concludes that while lower courts improperly have
instructed juries to apply an objective, "reasonable person" standard in
determining whether certain speech constitutes a "true threat," appropri-
ately instructed juries have an essential role to play in serving as a popu-
lar check on abusive government practices that seek to chill speech
critical of government officials and their policies. The Article calls for a
standard of conditional relevancy derived from Rule 104 of the Federal
3. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (statement at anti-war rally that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle,
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." was not a true threat, but rather, political
hyperbole).
4. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ("constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action").
5. G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 1063.
6. Id. at 1054.
7. See Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 761, 765 (1986) ("The common wisdom is that if juries were given more decisional power in
these areas, either by increasing the range of issues they could consider or by granting juries
greater immunity from appellate review, free speech would suffer a crippling blow.").
8. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
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Rules of Evidence that would allow such questions to go to the jury once
the judge makes the initial determination that there is sufficient evidence
of a subjective intent to threaten. Such a standard would balance the
role of the judge and jury in such cases consistent with the First Amend-
ment, and ensure that jurors continue to play a meaningful role in serv-
ing as an essential check on unaccountable government officials, as they
did 269 years ago in the Peter Zenger trial.9
Part II of this Article sets the stage. It examines recent investiga-
tions by federal agents of persons engaged in satirical speech considered
threatening to the President, as well as growing popular intolerance of
dissent and offensive humor. It also looks at the role of the Secret Ser-
vice in investigating perceived threats to the President, examining Secret
Service practices and training materials, including threat assessment pro-
cedures. In each of the discussed cases in which the Secret Service
launched an investigation, it appears that the Service ultimately came to
the conclusion that there was no true threat. This section demonstrates
how the Secret Service's actions have had a chilling effect on satirical
speech, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the true threat doctrine.
Part III examines the role of political satire in democratic self-gov-
ernance. It looks at the various literary techniques used to achieve polit-
ical satire, including parody, irony, political hyperbole, wit, and
sarcasm. It examines how political satire has served as an essential
vehicle for political and social change. It then looks at the protection the
Supreme Court has afforded to political satire, and the underlying theo-
ries for protecting outrageous speech.
Part IV focuses on the true threat doctrine as applied to perceived
threats against the President, his family, former Presidents, and other
high-ranking government officials. I have chosen to focus on perceived
threats against the President and high-ranking officials because of the
apparent tendency of the Bush Administration to interpret satirical
speech and political hyperbole as highly threatening, and to use the
9. The Peter Zenger trial in 1735 is considered the classic case of jury nullification. See,
e.g., CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 34 (1998); Ric
Simmons, Is There Room for Democracy in the Grand Jury System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, l1
(2002). Peter Zenger had published criticisms of William Cosby, the Governor of New York
under the British Crown, in the New York Weekly Journal. As a result, he was prosecuted for the
common law crime of seditious libel. Zealously defended by his lawyer, Andrew Hamilton,
Zenger was acquitted by the jury, even though his acquittal was contrary to the law of seditious
libel. See JAMES A. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (S. Katz ed. 1963); The Trial of Mr. John
Peter Zenger (1735), in 17 HOWELL'S ST. TRIALS 675 (1816). Historically, the Zenger trial has
stood for the principle that criticism of government officials is fundamental to a free society and
that juries can serve as an important check on oppressive regimes. See Schauer, supra note 7, at
761-62.
2004]
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threat statutes, which were intended to punish actual threats of physical
harm, to chill unwanted speech. I will show that, despite the speech-
protective language in Watts, many of the circuits have interpreted the
First Amendment narrowly, finding many cases of political hyperbole to
rise to the level of a true threat whenever the context is distinguishable
from Watts. This section examines whether the federal government is
abusing its powers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 876, 879, and related stat-
utes to target persons, such as those in the case studies discussed below,
who engage in unpopular speech critical of government officials and
their policies. It also examines whether the lower courts have been com-
plicit by lowering the standard set by the Court in Watts and conflating
the true threat doctrine with the incitement standard. It looks in particu-
lar at how both federal agents and the lower courts have applied threat
statutes to satirical speech and political hyperbole, and in so doing have
undermined the fundamental principle set forth in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,1" Watts, Brandenburg, and other seminal First Amendment
cases.
Part V discusses the implications of the Court's recent decision in
Virginia v. Black in revitalizing the true threat doctrine. It looks, in
particular, at the Court's discussion of the true threat doctrine and how it
applies that doctrine in examining the constitutionality of Virginia's
cross burning statute. The Court in that case found that a state may,
consistent with the First Amendment, ban cross burning carried out with
intent to intimidate. It also found, however, that the evidentiary provi-
sion in the Virginia statute under which cross burning was prima facie
proof of intimidation was unconstitutional, because it proscribed speech
protected under the First Amendment.
A concluding section proposes an evidentiary standard based on
principles of conditional relevancy for the courts to apply in determining
whether certain speech constitutes a true threat. Under this standard,
such questions would go to the jury only if the judge determined that
there was sufficient evidence of a subjective intent to threaten for a jury
to find that the defendant's statements or conduct constituted a true
threat. The Article concludes that if the American people are to con-
tinue to care about freedom of speech, they must have input into the
legal process, including the power, as jurors and citizens, to check the
kinds of government abuses described below. The Article also con-
cludes that there is a danger in attempting to distinguish political satire
and political hyperbole in the print and broadcast media from satirical
and hyperbolic statements by private individuals because such an
approach would undermine one of the corrective and progressive pur-
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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poses of political satire, which is to educate and provoke the polity to
call for social and political change.
II. SATIRICAL SPEECH UNDER SIEGE
In its report Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post-9/1J America,"
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") details attacks on free-
dom of expression across the country by federal, state, and local govern-
ment actors as well as by non-state actors. The Freedom Forum's First
Amendment Center has detailed similar incidents.' 2 In one such case,
A.J. Brown, a freshman at Durham Technical College in Raleigh, North
Carolina, received an unexpected visit at her home from the U.S. Secret
Service on October 27, 2001, in response to an anonymous tip that
Brown had an "anti-American" wall poster in her apartment. 3 The anti-
death penalty poster showed George W. Bush holding a rope, with pic-
tures of numerous hanging victims in the background. The poster read
at the top, "We hang on your every word," and indicated below:
"George Bush: Wanted, 152 dead," a reference to the fact that Texas had
executed 152 people while Bush was governor. 4 The Secret Service
agents asked Brown whether she had information on Afghanistan or the
Taliban, and had her fill out a form, but stopped short of taking any
further action.' 5
In a similar incident in late August 2001, reported by the Freedom
Forum, the Secret Service paid a visit to Jesse Ethredge, a 58-year-old
Georgia man whose truck bore stickers attacking President Bush and
Republicans. One sticker featured a child urinating directly above
another sticker with the word "Republicans." Other stickers read,
"Thief, Liar, Two-Faced Murderer George Bush," "Hell with Bush and
All Damn Republicans," and "Don't U Blame Me." The Secret Service
asked Ethredge what the stickers meant, and what he would do if Bush
were to come down his driveway, to which he replied, "I'd tell him to
get out as fast as he come in it." Apparently no further action was taken
after the Secret Service determined that Ethredge posed no threat to the
President.' 6
11. ACLU, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/1I AMERICA (2003) [hereinafter
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE].
12. See http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org.
13. FREEDOM UNDER FIRE, supra note 11, at 5.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Associated Press, Man's Anti-Bush Bumper Stickers Prompt Visit by Secret Service (Sept.
1, 2001) (reprinted by the Freedom Forum at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/
document.asp?documentlD=14780). The article also describes how over ten years ago, Ethredge,
who worked as a civilian employee at Robins Air Force Base, faced a similar incident when he
was ticketed for "provoking speech on a truck" after driving his camper shell onto the Air Force
20041
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In a third incident, in August 2001, John Fischer was arrested and
charged with disturbing the peace in the mountain town of Estes Park,
Colorado, when witnesses reported that he had handed out toilet paper
and urged persons to throw it at the President's motorcade. The toilet
paper rolls featured the smiling faces of President Bush, Vice President
Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, and Attorney General John Ashcroft, with the words
"Bush Wipe," "Dick Wipe," "Colin Wipe," "Rump Wipe," and "Ash
Wipe" on each roll. Secret Service agents directed the local police to
take Fischer into custody and later questioned him at police headquarters
to determine whether he posed a threat to the President.' 7 Although
Fischer denied that he had told people to throw the rolls, he reported that
he was held for over an hour and interviewed by Secret Service agents,
who told him that the toilet paper rolls were missiles that posed a threat
to national security.18 He was fined $150 for distributing literature on a
public street, a charge that the ACLU succeeded in having dismissed.
No further action was taken, however, by the Men in Black.
It is intriguing and perhaps worth exploring that each of these inci-
dents took place either immediately before or within weeks after the
attack on the World Trade Center. Yet well before the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the Bush Administration already appeared to have lost
its sense of humor. On February 7, 2001, Glenn Given, managing editor
of the Stony Brook Press, a student newspaper at SUNY-Stony Brook,
wrote and published an editorial entitled, Editorial: Dear Jesus Christ,
King of Kings, All I Ask Is That You Smite George W. Bush. In that
editorial, he also asked Jesus to "claim the life" of the Vice President
and the cabinet members, or to subcontract the work out to "some other
biblical figure" or "some crazy mortal.' 9 Given said that the editorial
was intended as political satire.2 0 Yet a week later, on Valentine's Day,
University Police and the U.S. Secret Service descended unannounced
base with a sign directed at Bush's father, which read, "Read my lips[:] hell with Geo. Bush."
The ticket was dismissed, but Ethredge took the case to the Eleventh Circuit, where the court
upheld the Air Force base administrative order banning "bumper stickers or other paraphernalia"
that "embarrass or disparage the commander in chief." Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir.
1995). The court found that the order did not violate the First Amendment where the order applied
to a non-public forum, did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, and where military officials
had sufficient justification to enact the order in the belief that such signs would undermine
military order. Id. at 1328-29.
17. Telephone Interview with John Fischer (July 23, 2003).
18. Associated Press, Free Speech on a Roll (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://
www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD= 14623.
19. Glenn Given, Editorial, Dear Jesus Christ, King of Kings, All I Ask Is That You Smite
George W. Bush, STONY BROOK PREss, Feb. 7, 2001, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/
documents/ssprotest.pdf. (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
20. Telephone Interview with Glenn Given (July 21, 2003).
[Vol. 58:843
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on the offices of the Stony Brook Press. They initially demanded to
speak to the entire editorial board, but spoke with Given when he
claimed responsibility for the editorial. They took him to a campus
security office and questioned him for close to an hour without an attor-
ney and without advising him of his rights. They convinced him to sign
waivers allowing for the search of his home and a review of his medical
records. They asked him whether he was a member of any dissident
groups, if he had ever had any problems with the law, and if he had ever
been institutionalized for psychiatric care. They told him that his edito-
rial was not protected by the First Amendment, because it was incite-
ment speech, and that they might file charges if they received additional
complaints.2
Given agreed to sign the waivers, but, according to the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, he did so under threat of arrest and
without legal counsel.22 When the Secret Service searched his home,
they went through his books and papers, looking for the Unabomber
Manifesto and other literature that might indicate he was a subversive.
Given reports that the school newspapers disappeared from their racks
on campus, and that the remaining batch of undistributed newspapers
disappeared from the loading dock.23
Most recently, on July 21, 2003, the Secret Service visited the
offices of the Los Angeles Times in an attempt to speak with conserva-
tive political cartoonist Michael Ramirez.24 On Sunday, July 20, the
L.A. Times had published one of Ramirez's cartoons, which was a take-
off on the famous Pulitzer Prize winning photograph showing South
Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan summarily executing a Viet
Cong prisoner in the streets of Saigon. The cartoon showed a man who
resembled General Nguyen with a gun aimed at the head of a caricature
21. Id.
22. Telephone Interview with Gregg P. Leslie, Legal Defense Director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press (July 17, 2003). The Reporters Committee wrote to the
Director of the Secret Service the next day. It demanded that the Secret Service issue a formal
apology, that it educate its agents to be more sensitive to First Amendment issues, and that it
clarify that it would not pursue charges against Given. See Letter from Reporters Committee for
the Freedom of the Press, to Brian Stafford, Director, U.S. Secret Service (Feb. 15, 2001), at http:/
/www.rcfp.orglnews/documents/ssprotest.pdf. In response, the Secret Service issued a letter in
which it defended its actions as within its authority to protect the life of the President.
Furthermore, it cited to an editorial by Glenn Given in Newsday, where he indicated that he did
not blame the Secret Service and was glad they took every call made to them seriously. See Letter
from H. Terrence Samway, Assistant Director, Office of Government Liaison and Public Affairs,
U.S. Secret Service, to Gregg P. Leslie, Legal Defense Director of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press (Mar. 14, 2001) (on file with the author).
23. Telephone Interview with Glenn Given, supra note 20.
24. Cartoon in 'Times' Prompts Inquiry by Secret Service, L.A. TLmEs, July 22, 2003, at B 14
[hereinafter Cartoon Prompts Inquiry].
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of George W. Bush. This time, the executioner wore a uniform with the
word "Politics" on it, and the scene took place against the background of
Iraq. The Secret Service agent was not allowed by the L.A. Times to
meet with Ramirez, but did meet with L.A. Times attorney Karlene Gol-
ler.2 5 Later that week, Congressman Christopher Cox, chairman of the
House Homeland Security Committee, accused the Secret Service of
using "profoundly bad judgment" in seeking to question Ramirez, and
demanded an apology for Ramirez, and a public explanation "both of
how this happened and why it will not happen again." 6 Ramirez later
commented that the cartoon was not intended to be an attack on Presi-
dent Bush, but rather to condemn those persons who sought to use the
current situation in Iraq to assassinate the President's character.2 7
John Wooden, editor of the website www.whitehouse.org, a parody
of the official White House website, has a theory to explain the Men in
Black's actions. He suggests that they are responding to what he refers
to as the "Patriotism Gestapo," a growing group of private citizens who
believe that political dissent is unpatriotic and who feel it is their duty to
inform on their fellow Americans. Wooden would like to believe that
Secret Service agents are simply doing their job, that when they receive
a call regarding a possible threat to the President, they must respond, no
matter how unlikely the threat may be.28
To a certain extent, Wooden's view is supported by public docu-
ments on the operating procedures of the Secret Service. In 1998, the
U.S. Department of Justice published a guide on "Protective Intelligence
& Threat Assessment Investigations," which describes the process the
Secret Service goes through in assessing whether a target of its investi-
gations is a threat to the President or other public official.29 The guide
indicates that the "purpose of U.S. Secret Service threat assessment and
protective intelligence activities is to identify, assess, and manage per-
sons who might pose a threat to those we protect, while the goal of these
activities is to prevent assassination attempts."30 The guide describes
the methodology the Secret Service uses in conducting an investigation,
including identifying a possible target.31 It indicates that the investiga-
25. Id.
26. Associated Press, Lawmaker." Questioning of Cartoonist Wrong (July 22, 2003), available
at http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/breaking-news/6360738.htm.
27. See Cartoon Prompts Inquiry, supra note 24.
28. Telephone Interview with John Wooden (June 12, 2003).
29. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE & THREAT ASSESSMENT
INVESTIGATIONS: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (July 1998)
[hereinafter THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDE].
30. Id. at iii.
31. The Threat Assessment Guide indicates that certain individuals come to the attention of
the authorities after making a threat against a protected person or being accused of making a
[Vol. 58:843
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tion should seek information about the facts that brought the subject to
the attention of the authorities, and general information about the sub-
ject, including educational background, criminal history, interest in
extremist ideas or radical groups, and mental health history.32 The guide
underscores that the purpose of protective intelligence investigations is
to prevent an attack rather than secure an arrest or conviction. Thus, the
guide concludes, "any errors should be made on the side of safety and
violence prevention."33 Several targets of the Secret Service's investiga-
tions discussed above indicated that they were interviewed to determine
whether they "fit the profile." Both Glenn Given and John Fischer said
they were asked whether they had ever been institutionalized.34 Glenn
Given was pressured into signing a waiver for the release of his medical
records.35 The guide shows little concern, however, regarding the First
Amendment interests at stake. Rather, it indicates that if the Secret Ser-
vice is to carry out its mission, it must often err on the side of safety.
Recent events suggest that the Secret Service is more prone to error than
ever before,36 and that rather than gathering evidence before opening a
case, as the Threat Assessment Guide prescribes, the Secret Service is
launching investigations against individuals where there is no conceiva-
ble threat to the President.
Some would argue that the Secret Service has a duty to respond to
every reported threat, no matter how improbable the actual threat may
be. But another incident, occurring in December 2002 and personally
involving Wooden, casts doubt on his theory that private citizens with
patriotic zeal are to blame for this recent rash of investigations. Unlike
the other cases, this incident did not involve the Secret Service or a
threat to the President of the United States; rather, it involved the Office
of the Vice President. In December 2002, David S. Addington, Counsel
threat. Id. at 36. According to the guide, threats should always be taken seriously and
investigated. Id. Once a case has been opened, the protective intelligence investigator is supposed
to develop "an investigation plan with the primary goal of collecting information and evidence
that will help determine whether an individual has the interest, motive and capacity to mount an
attack on a target." Id. at 37. The guide indicates that most protective intelligence investigators
rely on an interview with the individual who is the focus of the investigation as a key source of
information. Id. According to the guide, it normally makes sense to gather preliminary
information about a subject's background and interests before conducting an interview. Id.
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id. at 39.
34. Telephone Interview with Glenn Given, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with John
Fischer, supra note 17.
35. Telephone Interview with Glenn Given, supra note 20.
36. Traditionally, the Secret Service was part of the Department of the Treasury. As part of
the major government restructuring that took place following passage of the Homeland Security
Act, the Secret Service is now part of the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security
Act, Pub. L. 107-296, § 1703, 116 Stat. 2135 (2003).
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to the Vice President, sent Wooden a letter on the Vice President's offi-
cial stationery requesting that he remove from his website a parody of
the Vice President's wife, Lynn Cheney. The parody contained a satiri-
cal biography and a picture of the Second Lady. The letter from the
Vice President's counsel, while written as a "request" to delete the pho-
tographs and fictitious biographic statements, was perceived by Wooden
as threatening in nature. The letter was in the form of a legal opinion,
and cited court cases extensively. It contended that it was "important to
avoid using her name and picture for the purposes of trade without her
consent" and to "avoid portraying her in a false light." 37 The letter also
stated that the website's disclaimer indicating that the site was a parody
was inadequate. 38 Furthermore, the letter claimed that the use of the
likeness of the presidential seal was a violation of federal law; the letter
ignored the fact that the so-called likeness depicted a vulture rather than
the American bald eagle.39 The letter requested written confirmation
that Chickenhead Productions, Wooden's company, would remove the
photographs and fictitious biography from its website.4 °
In response, Wooden doctored the photograph of Lynn Cheney to
add a red clown nose and to black out one of her teeth. He then pro-
ceeded to publish the letter from the Vice President's counsel on the
website. 4 ' After Wooden's attempts to publicize the incident in the
media initially fell on deaf ears, he contacted the ACLU, which took
over the case and, as Wooden put it, "worked its magic. '"42 Once the
ACLU confirmed that the letter came from the Office of the Vice Presi-
dent, the ACLU succeeded in publicizing the case in the New York
Times and other national news outlets. Although the White House ini-
tially refused to comment on the story, within twenty-four hours offi-
cials were claiming that the letter was unauthorized.43
Do these recent events reflect broad-based efforts across the United
States by federal and state officials to limit dissent? Or are they the
work of a growing group of private citizens who believe political dissent
is un-American? Or, perhaps, are they not censorship at all, but rather
the result of free market economics and standards of civility? In her
recent book, Treason, Ann Coulter, a graduate of the University of
37. See Letter from David S. Addington, Counsel to the U.S. Vice President, to John A.
Wooden (Dec. 12, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.org/administration/love-letter.asp
[hereinafter Addington Letter].
38. Id.
39. See http://www.whitehouse.org.
40. Addington Letter, supra note 37, at 2.
41. See www.whitehouse.org/administration/love-letter.asp.
42. Telephone Interview with John Wooden, supra note 28. (June 12, 2003).
43. Id.
[Vol. 58:843
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Michigan Law School, accuses American liberals of siding with the
enemy whenever the United States is under attack." She argues that
"[liberals invented the myth of McCarthyism to delegitimize imperti-
nent questions about their own patriotism. '4  She cites the example of
the 1988 presidential election campaign, when Massachusetts Governor
Michael Dukakis accused then-Vice President George H.W. Bush of
red-baiting in the style of Joe McCarthy after Bush pointed out that
Dukakis had vetoed a bill requiring Massachusetts students to say the
Pledge of Allegiance.4 6 Yet even patriotism may have its limits. Coul-
ter was dropped as a contributing editor from the National Review
Online, when, after September 11, she urged the U.S. government to
"invade [Muslim] countries, kill their leaders and convert them to
Christianity."47
There are increasing signs that the American public, the federal
government, and state and local governments across the country are
unwilling to tolerate dissent in the current political climate, including
dissent that takes the form of political satire, hyperbole, parody, or sar-
casm. Similarly, many private actors that serve large segments of the
public, including owners of shopping malls and major media producers,
have demonstrated a disturbing intolerance of dissent and political
hyperbole."
A survey commissioned by the Freedom Forum's First Amendment
Center, conducted in 2002, 4" indicates that, while the public supports the
44. ANN COULTER, TREASON: LIBERAL TREACHERY FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 1 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Ann Coulter, This Is War: We Should Invade Their Countries, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
(Sept. 13, 2001), at http://www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter09l30.shtml. The bulk of the
column was a tribute to Coulter's friend Barbara Olson, the wife of U.S. Solicitor General
Theodore Olson. Barbara Olson was among the passengers who died aboard the planes hijacked
on September I1. Contextually, the column could be read as political hyperbole, in light of the
anger Coulter felt at the events of September 11, and the tragic loss of her friend. After Coulter
wrote in a follow-up column that Americans should be required to show passports to fly
domestically and that airline security should focus more on "swarthy males," the National Review
let her go, stating that it did "not want to be associated with the comments expressed in those two
columns." See Wannabe LP Candidate Ann Coulter Dropped by National Review Online,
LIBERTARIAN PARTY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, at http://www.lp.org/lpnews/01 I l/coulter.html.
48. See FREEDOM UNDER FIRE, supra note 11, at 7. See also David Bauder, ABC Nixes
'Politically Incorrect', ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2002.
49. First Amendment Center, State of the First Amendment 2002, at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/sofa2002report.PDF. The survey, commissioned by the
Freedom Forum's First Amendment Center and the American Journalism Review, was conducted
by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut, and consisted of
a random sample of 1,000 adults ages 18 and over who were interviewed between June 12 and
July 5, 2002. The sampling error was plus or minus 3% at the 95 percent confidence level. Id. at
39-40.
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rights guaranteed in the First Amendment in the abstract,50 49 percent of
the persons surveyed also believed that the First Amendment "goes too
far in the rights it guarantees."'5' Furthermore, 42 percent of those sur-
veyed in 2002 agreed that "the press in America has too much freedom
to do what it wants," while 49 percent agreed that the amount of free-
dom it enjoys is "about right."5 2
What explains this apparent paradox in the survey results? The
Freedom Forum concludes that a growing number of Americans view
the First Amendment as an obstacle to the war on terrorism.5 3 While a
substantial majority of Americans agree in theory that the freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment are important, in practice, the public
appears increasingly willing to sacrifice some of its liberty for greater
security.54
Similarly, a significant percentage of Americans appear less willing
to tolerate humor in books, on the Internet, and in the broadcast media
that they consider offensive. In another survey commissioned by the
First Amendment Center in 2002, results indicated that almost 40 per-
cent of Americans favored greater government restrictions on comedy
routines that made light of or trivialized tragedies like the World Trade
Center.5  The First Amendment Center concluded that "a significant
percentage of Americans are reluctant to give full First Amendment pro-
tection to comedic speech, art or performances that could potentially
insult or offend others. There appears to be a willingness to give up a
little liberty in exchange for fewer hurt feelings. 56
50. Id. at 22-23. When asked whether it was "essential that you have that right, important but
not essential, or not important," 75 percent agreed that it was "essential" that they have "the right
to speak freely about whatever you want," while 23 percent believed it was "important but not
essential." Id. Similarly, 68 percent agreed that it was essential that they have "the right to be
informed by a free press," while 26 percent believed it was "important but not essential." Id.
51. Id. at 22. In the 2002 survey, 41 percent of the persons surveyed "strongly agree[d)" that
the "First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees." This was a significant increase
from 2001, when only 29 percent strongly agreed with this view. In 2002, 8 percent "mildly
agree[d]" that it goes too far. The previous year, 10 percent had mildly agreed that the First
Amendment went too far. Thus, while in 2001, 39 percent of the persons surveyed felt that the
First Amendment gives us too much freedom, by 2002, this figure had risen to 49 percent. Id.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 3 ("Clearly, the terrorist attacks have taken a toll. Principles that sound good in the
abstract are a little less appealing when your greatest fear is getting on an airplane.").
55. First Amendment Center, Comedy and Freedom of Speech (2002), at
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/ComedyandFreedomofSpeech2002.pdf. In that survey, 51
percent agreed that the media have "too much freedom to publish whatever [they] want[ ]." Id. at
6. Moreover, 39 percent favored "government involvement to restrict public performances of
comedy routines that make light of or trivialize such tragedies" as the World Trade Center attack
or the Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 2.
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Growing intolerance of dissent and even political satire has begun
to take the form of increasing government and private restrictions on
core First Amendment values, including the freedoms of assembly,
expression, and the press. So-called threat speech is one of the areas
where the federal government still prosecutes individuals who speak out
against the President and other high-ranking government officials. A
growing body of decisions from the various federal courts of appeal has
upheld jury verdicts finding that the speech in question was a "true
threat" and not political hyperbole, despite the absence of any showing
of a subjective intent to threaten.
America has enjoyed a proud history of political satire and political
cartooning, dating to pre-Revolutionary War days.57 Furthermore, it is a
fundamental principle that the First Amendment protects the right to
engage in debate on public issues and public figures, which is vehement,
caustic and which, at times, subjects public figures to ridicule and
unpleasantly sharp attacks.58 When it comes to public figures, the First
Amendment severely limits tort remedies, such as defamation and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, that would insulate such individu-
als from hurt feelings. Public officials and public figures are expected to
give up a certain degree of sensitivity in exchange for a place in the
public spotlight.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of satire,
parody, and political hyperbole in a number of its decisions. In Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,59 in a parody of a Campari liqueur ad, Larry
Flynt portrayed Rev. Jerry Falwell talking about his "first time" in a
drunken, incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.6°
Falwell brought an action in federal court for libel, invasion of privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During discovery, when
asked why he created the ad parody, Larry Flynt said that one of his
objectives was to "assassinate" Falwell's integrity.6" The trial court dis-
missed the action for invasion of privacy, and the jury found against
Falwell on the defamation charge on the grounds that no reasonable per-
57. See Henry Ladd Smith, The Rise and Fall of the Political Cartoon, SATURDAY REV., May
29, 1954, at 7. Smith discusses how the earliest known example of political cartooning was one
printed by Benjamin Franklin in the Pennsylvania Gazette in 1754. The cartoon shows a picture
of a snake cut into sections with the caption "Join, or Die." The cartoon was understood to be a
call to unity among the colonies during the French and Indian War, with each segment
representing one of the colonies. The cartoon would appear during the next twenty years as the
colonies moved toward revolution. See BRUCE I. GRANGER, POLmICAL SATIRE IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: 1763-1783 (1960).
58. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
59. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
60. Id. at 48.
61. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986).
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son would have considered the parody to be fact.62 The jury found in
Falwell's favor, however, on the claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Rehnquist,
reversed. The Court held that Falwell, a public figure, could not recover
damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of the parody, no
matter how outrageous it might be. The Court held that "the First
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate and pub-
lic figures" and that "[w]ere we to hold otherwise, there can be little
doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to dam-
ages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its
subject."'63 The Court emphasized that the political cartoon is often "cal-
culated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal."'  It refused
to lay down a rule, based on the outrageousness of the attack. It decided
that "'outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. '"65
Similarly, several years earlier, in Watts v. United States, 66 a 1969
companion case to the better-known Brandenburg v. Ohio67 - the
Court's most recent and most liberal pronouncement of the "clear and
present danger test"68 - the Court overturned criminal sanctions against
Watts, a young man at a political rally charged with threatening the
President. In that case, Watts had participated in a series of workshops
at a political rally against the Vietnam War. Watts had received his draft
card and was supposed to report to the Army.69 In the presence of a
government infiltrator, he stated to the group, "I am not going. If they
ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J. '' 70 Watts was convicted of threatening the President under 18
U.S.C. § 871(a), and the verdict was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals. 71 The U.S. Supreme Court found, however, that Watts's
62. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 49.
63. Id. at 53.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 55.
66. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
68. Id. at 447 ("the Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action").
69. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
70. Id.
71. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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statement was not a "true threat," but rather, political hyperbole, made in
the context of expressing his opposition to the Vietnam War and to the
draft. The Court found that it had to "interpret the language Congress
chose 'against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' "72
Nonetheless, since Watts, the Court has failed to grant certiorari to
further clarify what kinds of statements against the President or high-
ranking officials are protected under the First Amendment. Lower
courts have begun to interpret the First Amendment's protections nar-
rowly when a threat to the President is involved. In light of current
doctrinal confusion in this area, and without a strong reaffirmance by the
Supreme Court, the decisions in Brandenburg, Watts and even Hustler
could be the latest victims of the war on terrorism.
II. POLITICAL SATIRE AND THE CONSTITUTION
When Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwelt73 came before the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1987, groups representing editorialists, political car-
toonists, and other journalists warned that a decision in favor of Falwell
would be a threat not only to parody and political satire, but to political
speech in general.74 The First Amendment enshrines the right to criti-
cize government officials and those in the public eye. Satire and parody
historically have been powerful vehicles for social criticism, going back
to ancient times.75 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
and fellow amici expressed concern that if the Fourth Circuit's decision
were allowed to stand, it would have a "dangerous and chilling effect"
on "editorialists, cartoonists, commentators and comedians - in fact all
those in the business of expressing their opinion about public figures. '"76
A. Some Definitions
Political satire is a literary or artistic devise calculated to expose
72. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (1964)).
73. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
74. Brief of Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. at 6, Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (No. 86-1278) [hereinafter Reporters Committee
Brief].
75. J.A. CUDDON, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND LITERARY THEORY 641
(4th ed. 1998) ("The origins of parody are ancient. Aristotle refers to it in Poetics and attributes
its invention to Hegemon of Thasos who used an epic style to represent men as being inferior to
what they are in real life.... Aristophanes used parody in the Frogs where he took off the style of
Aeschylus and Euripides.").
76. Reporters Committee Brief, supra note 74, at 2.
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political or religious leaders and their follies to ridicule, often through
the cruel exploitation of physical or mental traits or politically embar-
rassing events. 77 Satire is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as
"biting wit, irony, or sarcasm used to expose vice or folly."78 According
to the Unabridged Webster's Dictionary, satire is "literary verse or prose
the purpose of which is to ridicule or censure social or political abuses;
the technique employs parody, irony, wit, mockery and humor. ' 79 Satir-
ical expressions of opinion are generally aimed at those in the public
spotlight, and are designed to deflate or ridicule them.
Satire often has been justified by those who employ it as serving a
corrective role. 80 According to this perspective, the best satire is implic-
itly constructive. It has also served as a tool for politically and culturally
disempowered or marginalized groups. It seeks to expose vice and
hypocrisy in the hopes that the satirist's barbs will either be sufficiently
embarrassing to cause the target to recognize his or her vice and correct
it or cause the audience to recognize the need for change.8 1 It has been
said that a satirist's goals can be achieved "only to the extent that the
audience responds to the attack. ' 82 As Jonathan Swift wrote in his own
ironic self-eulogy:
As with a moral view design'd
To cure the vices of mankind:
His vein, ironically grave,
Expos'd the fool, and lash'd the knave.
Yet malice never was his aim;
He lash'd the vice but spar'd the name;
No individual could resent,
Where thousands equally were meant.
His satire points at no defect,
83But what all mortals may correct ....
77. See, e.g., M.H. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS 166 (5th ed. 1988) ("Satire
can be described as the literary art of diminishing or derogating a subject by making it ridiculous
and evoking toward it attitudes of amusement, contempt, scorn or indignation.").
78. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 464 (Home & Office ed. 1998).
79. COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED WEBSTER DICTIONARY 3762 (1963).
80. ABRAMS, supra note 77, at 166. See also Robert Harris, The Purpose and Method of
Satire I (May 14, 2001), at http://www.virtualsalt.com/satire.htm. Satire is "a literary manner
which blends a critical attitude with humor and wit to the end that human institutions or humanity
may be improved. The true satirist is conscious of the frailty of institutions of man's devising and
attempts through laughter not so much to tear them down as to inspire a remodeling"). Id. (citing
WILLIAM THRALL ET AL., A HANDBOOK TO LITERATURE (1960)).
81. See generally Harris, supra note 80, at 1-3.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Jonathan Swift, Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift, D.S.P.D. (1739), lines 314-16, 459-64,
reprinted at http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/rpo/display/poem2068.html (last modified May 29,
2002).
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Yet the satirist has no delusions about the redemption of his or her
target. As Harris writes, the world of the satirist "is a world of hypoc-
risy in which social standing, church membership, titles and degrees,
peer praise, lip service to morals, and wealth are all used to hide evils of
the first order."84 The satirist can only hope to expose vice or hypocrisy
and to demonstrate the dangers if allowed to continue.85
Rosenheim writes, "All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack
upon discernible, historically authentic particulars .... The reader must
be capable of pointing to the world of reality, and identifying the indi-
vidual or group ... which is under attack."86 More importantly in terms
of First Amendment protection, Rosenheim writes that "all satire
involves, to some extent, a departure from literal truth and, in place of
literal truth, a reliance upon what may be called a satiric fiction."87 This
clear departure from literal truth is what allows satire to survive an
attack by those who claim that satire's contents are defamatory. In Hus-
tler, the Court suggested that such literary or artistic attacks were a form
of "opinion" rather than a statement of fact, and thus did not constitute
defamation.88
Satire, distinguished from other types of humor by the diminishing
of a subject by ridicule, employs various literary techniques to achieve
its ends. Some of these devices include mockery, parody, irony, hyper-
bole (or exaggeration), wit, and sarcasm, several of which have been
challenged in the leading court cases.89 Mockery is making one the
"subject of laughter, derision, or sport."9 Parody has been defined as
the "imitative use of the words, style, attitude, tone and ideas of an
author in such a way as to make them ridiculous."9 Parody is consid-
ered a form of satirical mimicry whose purpose may be corrective as
well as condemnatory.92 Good parody is achieved by closely imitating
the original while at the same time deliberately exaggerating certain fea-
tures of the original that the parodist seeks to exploit.93 Burlesque is a
84. Harris, supra note 80, at 4.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Editorial Cartoonists et al., 1987 WL
864186 at *25 (Jun. 15, 1987), Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (No. 86-
1278) (citing EDWARD ROSENHEIM, SWIFT AND THE SATIRIST'S ART 25 (1963)).
87. ROSENHEIM, supra note 86, at 17. (emphasis in original).
88. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52-55.
89. See id. (use of parody or burlesque); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (use of
political hyperbole); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974)
(rhetorical hyperbole).
90. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2004), at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/
dictionary?book=dictionary&va=satire.
91. CUDDON, supra note 75, at 640.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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less subtle form of parody. It has been defined as a coarse or ridiculous
caricature and as "a literary or dramatic work that seeks to ridicule by
means of grotesque exaggeration or comic imitation. 94 Hyperbole is a
form of exaggeration in expression, often used with comic effect, to
reach those who will not listen as to what is possible.95 Sarcasm is a
bitter, sharp style of expression that cuts or taunts.96 Wit is defined as
"clever or apt humor." 97 Irony is subtle sarcasm or humor implying the
opposite of what is expressed.98
In Hustler, Falwell's attorney implored the Court to distinguish
Hustler's ad parody from more traditional political cartoons. 99 The
Court recognized that the ad parody was a "distant cousin" of political
cartooning." ° It was unwilling, however, to employ an "outrageous-
ness" standard in judging political and social discourse, because such an
approach was inconsistent with the First Amendment and would allow
juries to impose liability on the basis of their personal likes or dislikes of
a particular expression. 01 Furthermore, it would be anti-democratic to
protect only those forms of satire that appealed to more sophisticated
sensibilities. to2
B. Democracy, Political Satire, and Freedom of Expression
In short, both political satire and parody often involve attacks on
political or religious leaders using deliberate distortions of physical
characteristics, statements, or politically embarrassing events."0 3 Almost
by definition, they often involve reliance on a literary fiction or fantasy.
Furthermore, the purpose of satire and parody often is to make the object
of the satire suffer, whether through the hostility that the satire produces
in the minds of the reader or more directly, through the target's own
awareness of the assault made upon him or her."° As discussed above,
94. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 90, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/
dictionary?book=dictionary&va=burlesque.
95. See http://www.literatureclassics.comL/showterm.asp?IDNo=97.
96. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 90, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/
dictionary?book=dictionary&va=sarcasm.
97. Id. at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book-dictionary&va=wit.Id. Aat 4707.
98. Id. at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=dictionary&va=irony.
99. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 418 F.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("While
evening telephone calls to the White House are an offensive, bizarre medium of communication
- and this might well have led the jury to accept the utterances as threats - appellant's third
grade education and excessive drinking increased the probability of expression in an
unaccustomed way.").
103. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53-54.
104. Id. at 54.
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satire also serves a corrective role, either by bringing about a change in
the target's behavior or convincing the audience of the need for social
change. 0 5
In his dissent in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Falwell v. Flynt10 6
denying the appellants' petition for a rehearing en banc, Judge Wilkin-
son remarked that "[n]othing could be more threatening to the long tra-
dition of satiric commentary than a cause of action on the part of
politicians for emotional distress."'' 7 Such a cause of action is based
largely on the hurt feelings of the public figure in question.'0 8 Yet
unless such claims are considered with the First Amendment clearly in
mind, the elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress often will be present.' 0 9
Indeed, a satirist aims to attack, and while his or her motives may
often be to educate or to entertain the public, the satirist also may be
motivated by ill will toward the target of his or her attack. In Falwell v.
Flynt, when asked why he created the ad parody, Larry Flynt responded
that one of his objectives was to "assassinate" Jerry Falwell's integ-
rity." o To establish malice, it is not enough to show the ill will of the
speaker; it must be shown that the statement was made with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.' Satire
and parody, however, are often founded on a lie - putting a religious or
political figure in an absurd situation. The purpose of the parody at
issue in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell was to portray Jerry Falwell
as an immoral, incestuous, drunken hypocrite.'t 2 Jerry Falwell had held
himself out publicly as a moralist and religious leader.
The jury found that the parody was not libel because it could not
"reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [the respon-
dent] or actual events in which [he] participated."' ' Similarly, the
105. See generally Harris, supra note 80, at 1-2.
106. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 487.
108. See Reporters Committee Brief, supra note 74, at 50.
109. See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Editorial Cartoonists et al., supra note
86, at 29. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress typically require that: (1) the
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (3)
it caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. See, e.g., Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d
1068, 1079 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003); Simo
v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, 316 F.3d 974, 992 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith
v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449 (5th Cir. 2002); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d
1287, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 2001).
110. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986).
111. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
112. Id. at 48.
113. Id. at 49.
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Supreme Court held that Falwell could not bring a claim based on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress because "'[o]ne of the prerogatives
of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and mea-
sures.' "114 Furthermore, this right could not be circumscribed by an
outrageousness standard that would be subject to a jury's biases."'5
Political satire has been described as "the literary equivalent of a
bucket of tar and a sack of feathers." ' 6 If satire's chief instrument is a
direct, crude, and often tasteless attack on public figures or institutions,
why is it so important to democracy and so fundamental a component of
the First Amendment? Why must we tolerate outrageous speech?
One theory is that political satire often serves as a bridge between
citizens and government.' 1 7 It does this in several ways. First, it is a
subversive form of engaging the polity that often goes beyond the
bounds of good taste. It succeeds both by shocking and entertaining.
Whether through the written word or through political cartoons, it is a
means of mobilizing the electorate and overcoming political apathy.
As Gerald Gardner writes in The Mocking of the President: A His-
tory of Campaign Humor from Ike to Ronnie," 8 the one feature that
most totalitarian governments seem to have in common is the absence of
a sense of humor. He writes:
In a dictatorship the practice of satire is a jeopardous pastime indeed.
This is because no public figure willingly subjects himself to the
barbs of the satirist if there is some way to dispose of the troublesome
fellow .... So humor is considered subversive by the powers that be,
who often pay it the compliment of suppression." 9
Similarly, Morris Udall, former Democratic candidate for the presi-
dency, writes that "what's most remarkable about America is not that
any child can grow up to be President, but rather that any child or adult
can safely makes jokes about the President - and not just in the privacy
of his or her home."' 2 ° Like Gardner, Udall also underscores that we
tend to take for granted the fact that we live in a country "where laughter
of, by, and for the people is not regarded as a dangerous and subversive
force."'
12 1
In his book Heartland, Mort Sahl discusses the role of political
114. Id. at 51.
115. Id. at 55.
116. GILBERT HIGHET, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE 155 (1962).
117. MORRIS UDALL, Too FUNNY TO BE PRESIDENT Xiii-XiV (1988).
118. GERALD GARDNER, THE MOCKING OF THE PRESIDENT: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN HUMOR
FROM IKE TO BUSH (1988).
119. Id. at 12.
120. UDALL, supra note 117, at 1.
121. Id.
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satire as a critical means of educating the public about social and politi-
cal ills.'22 He describes how the political nature of his comedy routines
began to emerge in the mid-1950s, in the context of the Cold War and
persistent intolerance toward dissident viewpoints. 123 To Sahl, stand-up
comedy became a means of engaging his audiences in a political awak-
ening. He describes how he was repeatedly told by producers and
agents that "audiences were stupid"' 24 and that he was "too intellectual
for most people."'' 25 He describes how agents would tell him, "I don't
think the average man will understand you."'1 26 They advised him to
change his routine so as not to threaten the audience.' 27 He became
convinced, however, that "intelligent comedy can muster an audi-
ence." ' 28 He describes how, even more than political censorship, he
confronted "intellectual discrimination against the audience, which is the
most dangerous censorship of all."' 29 He describes intellectual discrimi-
nation as "the ultimate discrimination - to say that all people are intel-
lectually inferior, to place a ceiling on them. My God, I felt that had to
be contested and fought down to the wire."' 30
Sahl, described by Woody Allen as the father of modem comedy,
made a career of being an iconoclast.' 3 ' Sahl writes that he has stood on
the stage and attacked both the President and the Chief Justice, demand-
ing that his audience think about it even if they didn't laugh about it. He
also describes how he would read entire passages from the Warren Com-
mission Report to his audience, and make fun of it: "If you don't have
the skill to make the target humorous, you don't have the right to have
the audience's time."'' 32
In one central passage, he describes his relationship with his
audience:
I'd walk into the hungry i, and I was a hero. And somehow it was
never too intelligent for them. I found out, I guess, what teachers feel
like. You know, it's not a democracy, a school. And if you owe
anything to the students, it's to uplift them, to make knowledge
122. MORT SAHL, HEARTLAND (1976).
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 30.
126. Id. at 32.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 33.
131. Id. at 98-99. Sahl's first album was called Mort Sahl, Iconoclast. He often commented
that no one knew what an iconoclast was. Id. at 43. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes
an iconoclast as an image destroyer and as "one who attacks cherished beliefs or institutions."
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 256 (Home & Office ed. 1998).
132. SAHL, supra note 122, at 39.
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attractive. If you leave it to them, they're going to say, "On a demo-
cratic basis we prefer recess and chocolate milk."'
1 3 3
Second, besides its role in raising the political conscience of the
electorate, satire can also serve as a bridge between people and their
government by healing wounds left after a bitter election. As we learned
in 2000, a contentious election can leave deep wounds that are slow to
heal. 134 Humor can help heal these wounds when the electoral battle is
over, and ensure a peaceful transition (or retention) of power. As Gard-
ner wrote in 1988, "If we can laugh at the failure of our fallen hero or
the feet of clay of the victor, some of the pressure is released. It is a
consummation preferable to storming the palace."' 35 Political satire
educates and mobilizes the citizenry and serves as an escape valve for
the release of heightened political pressures after a bitter political con-
test. As Gardner writes, "Humor lets us take the issues seriously without
taking ourselves too seriously." '136
In addition, political satire serves another crucial role in democratic
governance. Udall describes humor as the "best antidote for the politi-
cian's occupational disease: an inflated, overweening, suffocating sense
of self-importance."' 37 Similarly, Gardner writes, "[H]umor has the
added merit of preventing the presidential candidate from developing
messianic delusions .... To find yourself the target of these witty men
is to be both humbled and freed of self-delusion."' 38 As Judge Wilkin-
son noted in Falwell v. Flynt,'39 "Satire is particularly relevant to politi-
cal debate because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and
unmasks hypocrisy. By cutting through the constraints imposed by
pomp and ceremony, it is a form of irreverence as welcome as fresh
air."14
0
IV. POLITICAL SATIRE AND THREATS TO THE PRESIDENT
When Glenn Given published his editorial in the Stony Brook Press
calling on Jesus Christ to smite George Bush and the members of his
Cabinet or to arrange for some other biblical figure or crazy mortal to do
so, Given hoped the editorial would provoke a reaction from his read-
ers.' 4 ' Except perhaps in his worst Orwellian nightmare, Given never
133. Id. at 31. The hungry i was a San Francisco nightclub.
134. GARDNER, supra note 118, at 12.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. UDALL, supra note 117, at xiv.
138. GARDNER, supra note 118, at 13.
139. 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 487.
141. Telephone Interview with Glenn Given, supra note 20.
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imagined that the Secret Service would accuse him of incitement to vio-
lence or threatening the President. 42
According to Given, the Secret Service told him that his editorial
was not protected speech. 43 Once the Secret Service had interrogated
Given and searched his apartment, however, they realized that he did not
pose a threat to the President. Thus, his article did not constitute a "true
threat." They told him, however, that it could conceivably provoke a
third party to act, and that this was incitement.' Certainly they did not
expect Jesus Christ or Moses to smite Bush, but Given had indicated in
his article that if Jesus were too busy, "Heck, even if you wanna get
some crazy mortal to do it that's cool with me. All I ask is that you
make sure that whoever does the job is thorough."'' 45 This was the lan-
guage that they found to be incitement speech.
Similarly, A.J. Brown's poster, although intended as a condemna-
tion of Bush's position on the death penalty, contained "Wanted" lan-
guage that concerned the Secret Service. John Fischer, the creator of the
Bush Wipes, was handing out toilet paper rolls to persons along Bush's
motorcade route, and was accused of encouraging people to throw these
so-called "missiles" at the motorcade. Jesse Ethredge, the Georgian
with the anti-Bush bumper stickers, already had been accused of under-
mining military order after driving his sticker-laden car onto a military
base ten years earlier. Michael Ramirez's cartoon showed a Vietnam
military official with the word "Politics" on his shirt holding a gun to
Bush's head against the backdrop of Iraq.
Interestingly, each of these cases might better be viewed as an
incitement case rather than a true threat case, and yet each of these indi-
viduals also was investigated and interrogated by the Secret Service to
determine whether he or she posed an actual threat to the President. In
1969, the U.S. Supreme Court had handed down a new standard for
incitement speech along with a ruling on true threats in companion cases
Brandenburg v. Ohio and Watts v. United States. Under Brandenburg,
the most speech-protective articulation of the incitement test to date, the
government cannot "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."' 4 6 It imposes a much higher threshold on the government
than threat speech, requiring an intent to produce imminent, lawless
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Given, supra note 19.
146. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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action, and a likelihood that such action will occur. 147
The true threat test, in contrast, requires the government to distin-
guish between an actual threat and mere political hyperbole. The gov-
ernment need not prove an actual intent to carry out the threat.148
Rather, the threat itself is the proscribed conduct. The prohibition on
true threats thus protects individuals not only from the likelihood that
the threatened violence will occur, but also from the fear and disruption
that threats of violence engender. 149
Although the tests are different and apply in different situations, the
courts have often conflated the two, leading to doctrinal confusion. t50
Moreover, it would appear that many lower courts have not only used
the "true threat" doctrine to circumvent the higher threshold required for
incitement, but have weakened that doctrine still further by ignoring the
speech-protective language in Watts. A majority of courts of appeal
have adopted a "reasonable person" standard that no longer requires that
the government present evidence of an actual subjective intent to
threaten.
A. Watts and its Wayward Progeny
1. WATTS AND THE TRUE THREAT TEST
In Watts v. United States,'5' the Supreme Court addressed what
types of threats against the President under 18 U.S.C. § 871 constitute a
true threat. Watts was an eighteen-year-old arrested during a public
rally near the Washington monument and charged under 18 U.S.C.
§ 871(a)' 52 with threatening the life of the President. He made his state-
147. Perhaps the modem day example of incitement speech would be Osama bin Laden's
calling on his followers to go out and commit terrorist acts. It was in part for this reason that the
Bush Administration was able to persuade major media organizations to review bin Laden's
videotaped statements before airing them, instead of airing the video live from al-Jezeera. The
Bush Administration was concerned that bin Laden would use these speeches to send "secret
messages" to his followers. See Mike Allen, Rice Interviewed on Middle Eastern Network, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A13.
148. See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003).
149. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
150. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (citing Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), enunciating the true threat doctrine for the proposition that
"[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for
unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must
be regarded as protected speech").
151. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) provided that:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for
delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing print,
missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President
or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of the President of the
[Vol. 58:843
MOCKING GEORGE
ments during a small group discussion of police brutality. Most of those
in the group were in their teens or early twenties, but present among
them was a government infiltrator from the Army Counter Intelligence
Corp.153 After one participant told other members of the group that they
"should get more education before expressing their views," Watts
angrily replied:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for
my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. 154
At this, Watts and several members of the group laughed. 5 Based
on this statement, Watts was arrested, charged with threatening the Pres-
ident under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a), and convicted by a jury of knowingly
and willfully threatening the President. 156 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit affirmed his conviction. 57
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court recognized that the nation
had an overwhelming interest in protecting the life of the President.'58
Nonetheless, while finding 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) constitutional on its face,
it also held that the statute, in making "criminal a form of pure speech,"
had to "be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment
clearly in mind."' 59 The Court found that, under the First Amendment,
the statutory language had to be interpreted "against 'the background of
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.' "160 It thus interpreted the statute con-
sistent with the First Amendment, to require the government to prove
that the defendant had made a true threat against the President.' 6 t
The Court agreed with Watts that his statement was nothing more
than a "'very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to
United States, or the Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise
makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice President or other
officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-
elect, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1982).
153. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 707.
156. Id. at 705-06.
157. Id. at 706 (citing Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
158. Id. at 707.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 708 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
161. Id.
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the President."" 62 It also considered the context in which the statement
was made, which was during a political discussion, and that the threat
was conditional upon Watts's being inducted into the Armed Forces,
something he vowed would never occur. In this context, the Court con-
cluded that Watts's statement was political hyperbole and did not fit
within the statutory language of a true threat.'63
2. WA7TS'S WAYWARD PROGENY
Despite Watts's speech-protective language, the Supreme Court's
failure to articulate a clear standard in that case or subsequent cases for
what constitutes a true threat has contributed to the doctrinal confusion
that has persisted for more than thirty years. Subsequent criminal cases
in the various circuits involving threats to the President and other gov-
ernment officials have departed from Watts, often upholding jury ver-
dicts of guilty despite evidence that the statements were not intended as
threats. In the majority of these cases, the jury was instructed to apply a
reasonable person standard to the question of whether a statement was a
true threat or protected speech. Juries are being asked to determine
whether a reasonable speaker, reasonable listener, or neutral observer
would perceive a particular statement as threatening. They rarely are
asked to determine whether a speaker actually intended a statement to be
a threat.
While free speech proponents attribute part of the problem to what
amounts to the negligence standard that the courts are applying, they
also argue that juries should not be allowed to decide whether such
speech is a true threat. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in rejecting a standard
based on the outrageousness of the speech, warned in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell that juries often will allow their personal dislike of partic-
ular speech to influence their decisions regarding whether certain forms
of outrageous speech are protected."6 Yet, despite Rehnquist's warn-
ing, there is strong disagreement over whether the jury has any role in
deciding whether certain statements are protected speech. The same
jury in Hustler that found the magazine liable for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress also found that Hustler could not be held
162. Id.
163. Id. The Court made reference to the objective standard applied in some earlier cases,
which had "found the willfulness requirement met if the speaker 'voluntarily uttered the charged
words with 'an apparent determination to carry them into execution."' Id. at 707 (quoting
Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918)). The Court expressed "grave doubts"
about whether this standard was appropriate. Id. at 708 (discussing Watts v. United States, 402
F.2d 686-93 (Wright, J., dissenting)). Nonetheless, the Court indicated the possibility that this
interpretation might be correct. Id. This language thus opened the door to the doctrinal confusion
that has ensued.
164. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
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responsible for libel because no reasonable person would perceive the
statements in the ad parody to be true.
Frederick Shauer writes that "by removing majorities from any
meaningful input into the consideration of free speech issues, we run the
risk that those majorities will cease to see free speech as something they
ought to care about."' 165 He suggests reaffirming the historic victory of
John Peter Zenger to give juries the power the check abuses by the gov-
ernment.1 66  He recognizes, however, that the prevailing view is that
juries today are a threat to free speech.167
A systematic review of much of the true threat case law can be
found in a recent article, Threats, Free Speech and the Jurisprudence of
the Federal Criminal Law, by Robert Blakey and Brian J. Murray. 68
The article demonstrates that a significant majority of the circuits, rather
165. Schauer, supra note 7, at 783.
166. Id. at 784-85.
167. Id. at 765 ("The common wisdom is that if juries were given more decisional power in
these areas, either by increasing the range of issues they could consider or by granting juries
greater immunity from appellate review, free speech would suffer a crippling blow.").
168. Blakey & Murray, supra note 5. Robert Blakey is a professor at Notre Dame Law School
and his former student Brian J. Murray, was a law clerk to a Ninth Circuit judge at the time of the
writing. The article soundly condemns the use of an objective "reasonable person" standard in
"true threat" cases as violating both First Amendment principles as well as principles of criminal
law. It also argues that the question of whether certain speech or expressive conduct is protected
or a "true threat" is a question of law for the judge to decide. Id. at 1052. It examines this case
law in the context of the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Planned Parenthood of the Colombia]
Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), which
nullified a Ninth Circuit panel's decision to strike down a $107 million jury verdict against the
American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA") for disseminating various "WANTED" posters of
abortion doctors and lists of abortion supporters over the Internet. Id. at 1088. The list of abortion
supporters had lines drawn through the names of persons who had been killed by extremists. The
en banc decision reversed the panel decision, thus upholding the $107 million verdict against
ACLA, on the grounds that its Internet postings constituted a "true threat" against the plaintiffs.
Id. The article by Blakey and Murray sharply criticizes the en banc decision, suggesting that
while it was made in the politically charged context of the abortion debate, it threatens the rights
of dissenters in other contexts, as well. Blakey & Murray, supra note 5, at 835-36. Judge
Kozinski wrote in his dissent that, "[w]hile today it is abortion protestors who are singled out for
punitive treatment, the precedent set by this court - the broad and uncritical deference to the
judgment of a jury - will haunt dissidents of all political stripes for many years to come."
Planned Parenthood of the ColombialWillamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1101. Planned Parenthood
appears to be yet another example of the courts applying a weakened "true threat" test to
circumvent the heightened standard of proof required in incitement cases. Under Brandenburg, in
order to prove incitement, the prosecution would have had to establish that the dissemination over
the Internet of "WANTED" posters and lists of pro-abortion individuals advocated the use of
violence, that it was intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and that it was likely
to produce such action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-95 (1969). Under the "true
threat" standard applied by the en banc court, the court found that the Internet postings constituted
a true threat because "'a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will be
subjected to physical violence upon his person.'" Planned Parenthood of the Colombia]
Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1075 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court thus upheld the $107 million verdict.
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than looking at the intent of the speaker, rely on an objective test for
determining what constitutes a true threat. 69 Most of the circuits do not
look at whether the speaker actually intended to make a threat or to do
the act he or she was threatening to do. 17 To summarize their research,
Blakey and Murray find that the predominant approach appears to rely
on whether a reasonable speaker would foresee his or her statements to
be threatening. This approach has been adopted in the First, Third, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits.' 71 The next most common approach is to
examine whether a reasonable listener would perceive the statement to
be threatening. This approach has been adopted in the Fourth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits.172 A third approach has been adopted in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit, and was recently applied by
the District Court in the D.C. Circuit. Under this approach, the courts
examine whether a neutral observer would construe the statements as a
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.' 73
In contrast, the Second Circuit has articulated a true threat test that
requires that the judge make the initial determination whether a defen-
dant's communication is a true threat rather than speech protected by the
First Amendment. 74 To qualify as a true threat, a statement must be so
"'unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person
threatened as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution.' ' ' 175 Once a statement meets this test, it is no longer pro-
tected speech and can be submitted to the jury. 1 7 6 Once such a showing
is made, the government need prove only that the defendant intended to
transmit the communication and that a reasonable person familiar with
169. Blakey & Murray, supra note 5, at 938.
170. Id. at 938-39.
171. Id. 940-70 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Whiffen,
121 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1986)).
172. Id. at 970-82 (citing United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356 (4th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc)).
173. Id. at 982-1002 (citing United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001); Metz v.
Dep't of Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964 (1 1th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Adams, 73 F. Supp. 2d 2, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (District Court found that
"the defendant's intention or ability to carry out the threat is irrelevant. The statute is violated so
long as a reasonable person, hearing the threat, would consider it a serious expression of an intent
to kill the President," thus suggesting a possible move away from the speech-protective approach
used by the D.C. Circuit thirty years earlier in U.S. v. Alexander, 418 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
discussed infra at 197).
174. Id. at 1003-06 (citing United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976)).
175. United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976)).
176. Id. at 123.
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the context of the communication would perceive it as threatening. The
government need not prove that the defendant actually intended the
statement to be threatening. 177
In the Sixth Circuit, the circuit court appeared to have adopted an
objective, hearer-based approach to true threats. Nonetheless, in a
recent decision, a district court in the Sixth Circuit relied on a standard
similar to the standard adopted in the Second Circuit, requiring "an une-
quivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific threat conveying an
imminent prospect of execution" for a statement to be a true threat
unprotected by the First Amendment. 78 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court decision dismissing the indictment, but declined to
address the First Amendment issues raised by the parties.
179
Blakey and Murray strongly criticize the use of an objective stan-
dard for evaluating whether certain speech constitutes a true threat.'
80
They also criticize the courts' reliance on jury verdicts for determining
whether certain speech is threatening, arguing that such determinations
should be questions of law for the judge to decide.' 8' Finally, in review-
ing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood of the Colombia!
Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, they argue
against the use of "context" in determining whether a statement was
threatening, especially when it involves a context over which the
speaker, in that case a pro-life activist, has no direct control.' 82
This Article focuses more narrowly on threats against the President
and other high-ranking government officials. Much of the true threat
case law involves threats to the President under 18 U.S.C. § 871. A
smaller but significant number of cases involve threats to the Vice Presi-
dent or presidential successors under § 871, or threats to the President's
family or to former Presidents and their families under 18 U.S.C.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1009 (citing United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 1995),
affd on other grounds sub nom.).
179. Id. at 1009 (citing United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997)).
180. Id. at 1062-63.
181. Id. at 1054.
182. Id. at 1078-81.
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§ 879.183 Another group of cases involve threats under § 876.184 The
remainder of this section will examine several cases at the borderline
between protected speech and true threats. Although I will focus on
threats to the President, I also will look at cases involving politically
charged language that led to prosecutions under one of these threat stat-
utes. I will examine a post-September 11 district court case, United
States v. Lewis,"8 5 from the Southern District of West Virginia, which
would appear to reflect the predominant approach currently used by the
circuits. In the following section, I discuss the Supreme Court's deci-
sion last term in Virginia v. Black, 86 which may breathe new life into
the speech-protective version of the true threat doctrine articulated in
Watts.
While I agree with Blakey and Murray that the First Amendment
demands that a court require the prosecution to prove a subjective intent
to threaten rather than apply the negligence standard used by most
courts, I disagree that the question of whether certain speech is a true
threat is solely a question of law for the judge to decide. I share
Schauer's perspective that we need to be sensitive to restrictions on
political speech by unaccountable government officials. As Schauer
writes, "We rely on notions of popular sovereignty while restricting the
people's ability to make any of the important decisions about how our
leaders will be controlled." '87 The Peter Zenger case stands for the pro-
position that, at a minimum, juries should retain the ability to check the
most extreme abuses of government. Leaving the decision of whether
183. Title 18 USC § 879(a) provides that:
Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm
upon - (1) a former President or member of the immediate family of a former
President; (2) a member of the immediate family of the President, the President-
elect, the Vice President, or the Vice President-elect; (3) a major candidate for the
office of President or Vice President or a member of the immediate family of such
candidates; or (4) a person protected by the Secret Service under section 3056(a)(6);
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 879(a) (2000).
184. Title 18 USC § 876(c) provides that:
Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered as aforesaid, any
communication with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto,
addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If such a communication is
addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or an official
who is covered by section 1114, the individual shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (2002).
185. 220 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
186. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
187. Schauer, supra note 7, at 782.
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certain speech is a true threat to an unelected and unaccountable public
official is arguably as much a threat to freedom of expression as leaving
the decision to the passions of a jury.
Lower courts, however, largely have ignored Watts' speech-protec-
tive standard. Soon after the Supreme Court issued its Watts decision,
the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit handed down widely varying deci-
sions interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 871 in light of Watts. In Roy v. United
States,1 88 decided four months after Watts, the Ninth Circuit made little
attempt to distinguish Watts, adopting a standard that has survived in the
circuit to this day and which is even cited by the U.S. Attorney's Office
as the proper standard for prosecuting perceived threats.1 89 The court
construed the statute's willfulness requirement "to require only that the
defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a context or
under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee
that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President."' 9°
The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of Richard Roy, a private
in the U.S. Marine Corps who was stationed at Camp Pendleton waiting
to be flown to Vietnam. At the last minute and against his wishes, he
was reassigned to a post in the United States. The night before the Pres-
ident was scheduled to visit the base, Roy was joking with other Marines
about the President's visit and how they were going to "get him with
cannons and how everybody was going to shoot them off."' 1
Roy then went outside the barracks to a pay phone, picked up the
receiver, and spoke to the telephone operator. The telephone operator
testified that Roy said, "Tell the President that he should not come
aboard the base or he would be killed." Roy testified that he said,
"Hello, baby. I hear the President is coming to the base. I am going to
get him." 9 The telephone operator held the line to attempt to identify
the caller. When Roy picked up the phone again, she asked for the
caller's name, and Roy gave a fictitious name. He also testified that he
told her that the statement about the President was a joke. 93 The call
was eventually traced to Roy, who was awakened early that morning,
taken into custody and charged and convicted with threatening the
188. 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969).
189. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 9 U.S. ATIrORNEY'S MANUAL § 1530 (Oct. 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading-room/usam/title9/crmO1530.htm.
190. Roy, 416 F.2d at 877.
191. Id. at 875.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 876.
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President. 194
In upholding the conviction, the Ninth Circuit appeared to make
virtually no attempt to distinguish the facts of Roy from those in Watts,
or to examine the case, as Watts requires, against the background of the
First Amendment. Rather, the court simply found that the trial court was
reasonable in interpreting Roy's statement that "I am going to get him"
as a threat to take the life or inflict bodily harm on the President. The
court looked at the legislative purpose of the statute, which was not only
to prevent assaults on the President but to prevent the "detrimental effect
upon Presidential activity and movement that may result simply from a
threat upon the President's life."'195 Thus, the court, in briefly address-
ing the Supreme Court's statement in Watts that it had "grave doubts"
about an approach that would impose liability based on the apparent
intent of the speaker, appeared to rely on policy arguments in favor of
protecting the President from perceived threats. 196
In contrast, two months earlier in Alexander v. United States 97 the
D.C. Circuit reversed a conviction based on facts similar to those in Roy
and remanded the case for a new trial. In this case, Alexander, who had
been drinking heavily, made five successive calls to the White House on
the evening of July 23, 1966.198 The calls, lasting about 50 minutes,
were directed to Secret Service agents, who taped them.'99 During those
50 minutes, Alexander made six statements of a threatening nature.2°°
"Typical statements were 'If I had a gun I would blow President John-
son's brains out' and 'Do you think I wouldn't do it if I had the artillery
to do it with?' "201 "The conversation also was interspersed with discus-
sions of the 'war in Viet Nam,' the 'Russians,' and other controversial
political topics. '2° 2 The agents on the phone asked Alexander for his
name, address, and phone number and he agreed to await the arrival of
other agents.20 3 He was still in conversation with the first group of
agents when the latter arrived to take him into custody. The agents
detected the odor of alcohol, but concluded that he was in control of
himself when he made the calls.2° ' Alexander was convicted of threat-
ening the President under 18 USC § 871. His only defense was that he
194. Id.
195. Id. at 877.
196. Id. at 876-77 n.8.
197. Alexander v. United States, 418 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
198. Id. at 1204.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1206 n.17.
202. Id. at 1204.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1204-05.
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was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to commit the crime.2 °5
While Alexander's appeal was pending and shortly after oral argu-
ment, the D.C. Circuit upheld Watts' conviction, and Watts' case was
appealed to the Supreme Court.20 6 The D.C. Circuit deferred its disposi-
tion of Alexander's case pending the Supreme Court decision in Watts;
it issued its decision two months after Watts was decided.20 7 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Roy, the D.C. Circuit's Alexander decision
closely followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Watts. The D.C. Cir-
cuit found that it was necessary to determine whether Alexander's state-
ments constituted a true threat in light of the Supreme Court's finding in
Watts that Watts's statements "were a 'kind of crude offensive method
of stating a political opposition to the President' which did not amount
to a 'threat. ' ' 20 8 It acknowledged the Supreme Court's warning in
Watts that courts must interpret the language Congress chose against the
background of the First Amendment and the principle that "'debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.' "209
The D.C. Circuit found that appellant was entitled to have the issue
of whether his statement constituted a true threat submitted to a jury.210
It found that a jury could have considered the defendant's statements to
be political "hyperbole, expressing strong disagreement with the Presi-
dent and his policies, rather than as threats upon his life. ' 21 1 The court
also noted that the appellant had cooperated in informing the Secret Ser-
vice agents of his whereabouts and waiting for their arrival, thus sug-
gesting a less ominous motive.212 Noting the fact that appellant's third-
grade education and excessive drinking suggested that he may have been
expressing his beliefs in an "unaccustomed way,"2 13 the court reversed
the case and remanded it to the district court for a new trial.21 4
These two cases, both decided in 1969, the same year as Watts, not
only raise the question of what the proper standard should be for deter-
mining what constitutes a true threat, but also who should decide. In
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,21 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
205. Id. at 1204.
206. Id. at 1205.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1205 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1207.
211. Id. at 1206-07.
212. Id. at 1207.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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concern that a rule based on the outrageousness of certain speech would
have an inherent subjectiveness that would allow a jury to impose liabil-
ity based on its tastes or views, or its like or dislike for a particular
expression.216 His decision in Hustler mirrors concerns expressed by
many First Amendment proponents that leaving the decision of what
constitutes a true threat to a jury would strike a devastating blow to free
speech. Yet the facts of these cases and the cases discussed below sug-
gest that there may be circumstances where a properly instructed jury of
one's peers would be more likely to view crude statements condemning
political leaders as expressions of political opposition rather than a true
threat. Contrary to Blakey and Murray's argument, I suggest that a
properly instructed jury applying a subjective intent standard is equipped
to determine whether certain speech constitutes a true threat. I argue,
however, that the trial judge should make a threshold determination of
whether sufficient evidence that the statement was intended as a threat
exists before submitting the question to a jury.
How has the true threat test fared in recent years? Perhaps one of
the most in-depth yet disappointing analyses of the true threat test is the
Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Kosma.2 7 The court upheld
the conviction of Louis Kosma for making threats against President Rea-
gan, applying an objective, reasonable person standard in interpreting
the language of 18 U.S.C. § 87 1.218 This case is significant because the
defendant was charged under both 18 U.S.C. § 871 for making a threat
against the President and under 18 U.S.C. § 879 for making a threat
against a former President.219 Even though both statutes require that a
defendant have acted "knowingly and willfully" in making a threat, the
district court found Kosma guilty of violating § 871 under an objective,
reasonable person standard, but not guilty of violating § 879, because
§ 879 requires a showing of subjective intent; that is, that the maker
intended the statement to be a threat.22 0 Based on psychiatric testimony,
the district court found that Kosma did not intend the letter sent to ex-
President Reagan on May 10, 1990, to be a threat, thus Kosma could not
be convicted under § 879.221 He could, however, be convicted under 18
USC § 871, the court found, because a "reasonable person would fore-
see that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
216. Id. at 55.
217. 951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991).
218. Id. at 557-59.
219. Id. at 552.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President.'122
The facts of the case demonstrated, however, that Kosma was not a
reasonable person, thus raising serious questions about whether the
objective, speaker-based test was appropriate in the context of criminal
prosecutions. In fact, recognizing this, the government had moved to
dismiss the complaint against Kosma without prejudice in October 1988,
premised upon his agreeing to receive in-patient psychiatric care.223
When Kosma violated the terms of his agreement, the charges were
reinstated.224
Kosma's attorney argued that Kosma's letters to the President,
though crude, offensive and inane, did not constitute true threats but
rather protected political speech under the First Amendment. He argued
that the letters were Kosma's "unique way of commenting on President
Reagan's fitness for office and his Administration's policies. '' 225 The
first communication was a postcard postmarked March 2, 1988, and
addressed to President Reagan "C/O Ye 01 Whitehouse. "226 The post-
card stated:
Mr. Reagan: You are hereby invited to PHILADELPHIA. We are
going to give you a 21 Gun-Salute. 21 guns are going to put bullets
thru your heart & brains. You are a Disgrace to the Air-Force. You
are a Disgrace to Teddy Roosevelt. You are a Disgrace to John F.
Kennedy. You are a Disgrace to Nancy Reagan. . . .You are in
Contempt of EVERYTHING that I represent, and standby, and
believe. Officially: an Act of Contempt of Court. Your name is
going to be removed from ALL documents, and books. OFFI-
CIALLY: you were NEVER the "president" of anything! !227
Similar letters and mailgrams were sent to President Reagan and his
press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, in April and July, accusing Reagan of
Crimes against Humanity, calling him "Lucifer" and "Saten," [sic] and
imposing an official death sentence because "impeachment is too
lienient [sic] for you. 2 28
Despite Kosma's attorney's arguments that his speech was pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the court concluded that "there was no
overtly political context for Kosma's letters. 229  In distinguishing
Watts, it found that "Watts' statements were made on the grounds of the
222. Id. at 557 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F. 2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
in original).
223. Id. at 552.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 553.
226. Id. at 550.
227. Id. at 550.
228. Id. at 551.
229. Id. at 554.
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Washington Monument during a political rally in which police brutality
was discussed" while Kosma, in contrast, "mailed his letters unsolicited
to the President. 23 ° Moreover, the court concluded that Kosma's "invi-
tations" to Philadelphia "were not as conditional as those in Watts,"
because Kosma "specified the precise date, time and place of the Presi-
dent's '21 gun salute."' 23' Third, while Watts directed his remarks at a
group that laughed when he suggested he would kill President Johnson,
the Third Circuit doubted that the staff of the White House mailroom
was laughing when they received Kosma's letters.232 The court noted
that many courts of appeal had found a wide range of threats to be
unprotected, including threats against the President. 23 3 The court found
that whether a speaker's language constitutes a threat was a matter to be
decided by the trier of fact.23 4
The court then went on to examine the appropriate standard for
judging a true threat. It rejected a subjective test as making it considera-
bly more difficult to prosecute threats against the President.235 In so
doing, however, it appears to have misconstrued the subjective standard,
interpreting it "to require proof that the defendant made the alleged
threat with specific intent to execute it."' 2 3 6 More recently, courts have
defined the subjective standard as requiring proof that the defendant
intended his or her statement to be a threat, regardless of whether the
speaker intended to carry out the threat.23 7
In Kosma, the government did not challenge the district court's
interpretation of § 879 as requiring subjective intent.238 Nor did the dis-
trict court's opinion explain why § 879 should be treated differently.239
In a footnote, the Third Circuit briefly noted that there is arguably less
reason to be concerned from a national security standpoint when a threat
is made against a former President, thus justifying a less rigorous objec-
tive, reasonable person standard in evaluating threats against a sitting
President.240 As in Roy, the court appeared to be relying on policy argu-
ments in favor of an objective test, rather than a rigorous application of
the threat statute consistent with the First Amendment.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 554.
233. Id. at 554-55.
234. Id. at 555.
235. Id. at 556.
236. Id.
237. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992).
238. Kosma, 951 F.2d at 552 n.4.
239. Id. at 552 n.5.
240. Id.
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A year later, in United States v. Gordon,241 in a case applying 18
USC § 879 to another threat against ex-President Reagan,242 the Ninth
Circuit appeared to adopt a standard for evaluating true threats which
considered not only whether a reasonable person would foresee the
statement to be threatening, as required under Roy, but also, interpreted
the "knowingly and willfully" language in the statute to require that the
speaker have a subjective intent to make a threat.243 The court clarified
the reasons for imposing a subjective standard; in citing to the legislative
history, it found that Congress, in passing 18 USC § 879, had construed
"knowingly and willfully" to require some evidence that the maker
intended the statement to be a threat.2 44
It should be noted, however, that the requirement that a threat
against the President be made "knowingly and willfully" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 871 is virtually the same as the language in 18 U.S.C. § 879, a more
recent statute dealing with threats to the President's family, and to for-
mer Presidents and their families. Yet, based on the legislative history
behind § 879, the latter statute has been interpreted as requiring some
showing that the speaker have a subjective intent to make a threat.245 In
contrast, most circuits, including the Third Circuit in Kosma, still inter-
pret 18 U.S.C. § 871 to require only a general intent to make the state-
ment, rather than a specific intent to threaten.246
The distinction the lower courts have drawn between the intent
requirements in § 871 and § 879, however, appears to be a distinction
without a real difference. Both sections use the same language requiring
that a defendant knowingly and willfully made a threat. Moreover,
§ 871 was first passed in 1916, during a very dark period in the nation's
First Amendment history,24 7 while § 879 was passed subsequent to the
Court's decision in Watts thus explicitly integrating the Court's ruling.
The Court in Watts, in finding § 871 constitutional on its face, inter-
preted the statute consistent with the First Amendment and the Court's
241. 974 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).
242. Id. at 1114. Gordon, who had completed a year of law studies at Boalt Hall in Berkeley,
California, broke into former President Reagan's home in California while he was absent. When
apprehended by the Secret Service, he repeatedly told them that Reagan was the "anti-Christ" and
that Gordon had to kill the anti-Christ. Id. at 1113.
243. Id. at 1117.
244. Id. at 1117 (citing H.R. ReP. No. 725, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982)).
245. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1991).
246. See Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557 ("In short, we believe that section 871 was intended to
criminalize the mere utterance of a true threat, rather than the defendant's intention to carry out
the threat.").
247. This was the same period when Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1918 outlawing
speech critical of the government's war effort. It was also the period when Eugene Debs's
conviction for sedition for criticizing World War I was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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evolving jurisprudence in this area. Moreover, the legislative history of
§ 879, in interpreting the meaning of "knowingly and willfully," noted
the doctrinal confusion among the lower courts regarding the mens rea
requirement and could be read as applying to true threats in general. 48
The most recent decision involving a threat to the President was in
United States v. Lewis,249 a decision of the district court for the Southern
District of West Virginia. The evidence showed that Edward Lee Lewis
sent five letters in January 2002 in the midst of the anthrax scare, each
of which contained an unidentified white powder, a cigarette butt, and a
photocopied handwritten note.25 0 Letters were addressed to a private
citizen, a county judge, a district court judge, the Governor of West Vir-
ginia, and President George W. Bush, and all but the letter to the private
citizen read, "I were you [sic], I'd change my attitude."'2 5' All of the
persons exposed to the mailings believed that they were exposed to the
lethal anthrax virus.252
Lewis was indicted on four counts of mailing threatening commu-
nications in violation of 18 USC § 876 (2002), one count of mailing a
threat to the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 871 & 2(b) (2002),
and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 253 At the
close of the government's evidence, the defendant timely moved for
judgment of acquittal, which was denied.25 4 Later, after the jury became
deadlocked, he moved again for acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial
on various grounds. Among these grounds, the defendant contended that
the communications could not reasonably be considered threatening.255
The district court disagreed, finding that in the context of the post-
September 11 anthrax outbreaks, the mailing of a powdery substance
through the postal system could be interpreted as a threatening form of
248. See H.R. REP. No. 725, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982) ("The Committee is aware that the
term 'knowingly and willfully' as used in section 871 has not been uniformly construed by the
courts .... With regard to section 879, the Committee recognizes the need to protect the safety of
protectees of the Secret Service and their ability to function free of fear. Moreover, the
Committee recognizes the fundamental interests shared by all Americans in free and uninhibited
speech, especially where public figures are concerned. Therefore, the Committee construes a
threat that is 'knowingly and willfully' made as one which the maker intends to be perceived as a
threat regardless of whether he or she intends to carry it out.").
249. 220 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
250. Id. at 549.
251. Id. It turned out that the photocopied note was taken from a letter that Lewis's ex-
girlfriend, Gloria Fields, had sent to him. The return addresses on each envelope Lewis sent bore
Fields's name. When questioned about the letters, Fields denied sending them, but admitted that
they were photocopies of her handwriting from a letter she had sent to Lewis. This led the
investigators to Lewis. Id. at 549-50.
252. Id. at 549.
253. Id. at 550.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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symbolic speech. 256  The court adopted an objective, listener-based
approach, finding that a reasonable recipient would interpret the mailed
communication as a threat of injury.25 7 It denied the defendant's motion
for acquittal and for a new trial.258
By 2003, virtually all of the circuit courts, rather than looking at
whether a speaker had the subjective intent to make a threat under § 871,
applied a variety of "reasonable person" standards to the question of
whether a speaker had "knowingly and willfully" made a threat. In
Watts, the Supreme Court in dicta had indicated that it had "grave
doubts" that the willfulness requirement would be satisfied if a speaker
"voluntarily uttered the words with 'an apparent determination to carry
them into execution.' "259 Nonetheless, it indicated the possibility that
such an interpretation might be correct, thus opening the door to con-
flicting constructions.26 ° Skelly Wright, in his dissent in Watts's case
before the D.C. Circuit, had interpreted the "knowingly and willfully"
language to require a subjective intent to carry out the threat.26 1 Virtu-
ally all the circuits have rejected this position.262 Similarly, the Supreme
Court recently found in Virginia v. Black that a speaker need not actu-
ally intend to carry out the threat for it to constitute a true threat.2 63
Nonetheless, the lower courts have confused a subjective intent to carry
out a threat with a subjective intent that a statement be threatening, find-
ing that for purposes of § 871 and threats to the President that a "reason-
able person" standard can apply.
In short, there is still a great deal of doctrinal confusion among the
courts, with some courts looking at whether a reasonable speaker would
perceive the statement to be threatening while other courts look at how a
reasonable listener would perceive a statement. To add to the confusion,
the Third Circuit suggested in Kosma that the "knowingly and willfully"
language in § 871, regarding threats to the President, has a different
meaning than the "knowingly and willfully" language in § 879, regard-
ing threats to former Presidents, family members, and other government
officials.2" The Third Circuit in Kosma acknowledged that § 879,
which was passed subsequent to Watts, requires some evidence of sub-
jective intent, but concluded that § 871 did not require subjective intent,
256. Id. at 558.
257. Id. at 559.
258. Id. at 560.
259. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (quoting Ragansky v. United States,
253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918)).
260. Id. at 708.
261. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting).
262. See United States v. Kosma, 749 F. Supp. 1392, 1398-99 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
263. 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003).
264. 951 F.2d at 553-558.
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despite the language in Watts that § 871 must be viewed against the
background of the First Amendment.
B. Virginia v. Black and the Revitalization of the True
Threat Doctrine
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Black 6 5 may
shed some light on the proper standard for evaluating whether speech or
symbolic conduct rises to the level of a true threat. Justice O'Connor
has left a legacy of carefully crafted compromise decisions, and Virginia
v. Black, a consolidated case involving two separate prosecutions for
cross burning with intent to intimidate, is no exception. In a plurality
decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court ruled that a
state, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning car-
ried out with an intent to intimidate.2 66 The Court also found, however,
265. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
266. Id. at 1549. This case is most likely to generate a great deal of scholarship regarding
whether its ruling truly was distinguishable from the Court's earlier decision in R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). This Article does not focus on that aspect of the Court's opinion,
but briefly summarizes the Court's analysis and some of the questions it has raised. The Virginia
Supreme Court had invalidated the Virginia statute on the grounds that it discriminated on the
basis of content and viewpoint in violation of the Court's R.A. V. holding. In R.A. V., the Court
held unconstitutional a local ordinance that banned certain symbolic conduct, including cross
burning, because the ordinance specifically targeted only those individuals who provoked violence
on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, or gender." The Court in RA.V. found that the
ordinance was unconstitutional as a content-based restriction on expression because the ordinance
imposed "special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id. at
391. The Court in Virginia v. Black distinguished its decision in R.A. V. on the basis that that the
Virginia law in question outlawed all forms of cross burning when the purpose was to intimidate,
not merely cross burning done on a particular basis such as race, color, creed, religion, or gender.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549. At least one legal scholar has suggested that this reasoning was
somewhat disingenuous, since in virtually all cases, cross burning is done to intimidate on the
basis of race, color, or creed. See Key Rulings from Supreme Court Term Reviewed, University of
Virginia School of Law (Sept. 16, 2003), at http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/
2003_fall/supctrv.htm. (" 'Very few people burn crosses for warmth or illumination,' [Dean John
Jeffries] observed. 'Throughout our history, crosses have been burned for the purpose of
frightening and intimidating people and everyone knows it' . . . . [Jeffries] said the court tried to
draw a distinction between a law that forbid [sic] cross burning when it specified race, creed or
gender for the victim (unconstitutional) and the Virginia one that applied universally
(constitutional). The distinction ignores the cultural history of cross burning, he said, which is
clearly about race and religion.") Nonetheless, the Court pointed out that in one of the two cases
in question, "it is at least unclear whether the respondents burned a cross due to racial animus."
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549. In Black, the Court noted that the defendants burned a cross in their
African-American neighbors' yard because the neighbors had complained about the presence of a
shooting range in one of the defendants' yards, not because of any racial animus. Id. The Court
also noted that the First Amendment does not prohibit all types of content discrimination. In
particular, the Court noted that where "the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of
the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
view point discrimination exists." Id. For example, quoting R.A.V., the Court noted that while
threats of violence are outside the First Amendment, the federal government could choose to
"criminalize only those threats of violence directed at the President ...since the reasons why
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that, as applied, the evidentiary provision in the Virginia statute, under
which cross burning is prima facie proof of intimidation, was unconsti-
tutional because it proscribed speech protected under the First Amend-
ment.267 In so doing, the decision appears to have clarified the standard
for what constitutes a true threat, reaffirming the Court's decision in
Watts.
2 6 8
In Part III of the Court's decision, the Court notes that the First
Amendment permits a state to ban a true threat. 269  The Court, citing
Watts, defines true threats as "those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. 27 °
The Court indicates that a speaker need not actually intend to carry out
the threat.271 The prohibition on true threats is intended to "protect indi-
viduals from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear
engenders," in addition to protecting people from the "possibility that
the threatened violence will occur. 272
Nonetheless, the Court suggests, albeit implicitly, that the speaker
must intend to make a threat for the threatening language or conduct to
constitute a true threat.273 The Court identifies "intimidation" as a type
of true threat where "a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
threats of violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when applied to the
person of the President." Id. (citing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388). Similarly, the Court noted, just as a
state may regulate only that obscenity which is the most obscene, "[i]nstead of prohibiting all
intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence." Black,
123 S. Ct. at 1549.
267. Virginia's cross-burning statute, § 18.2-423, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate
a person or group of persons.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
268. In Black, the Court makes specific reference to the true threat doctrine as applied to
threats against the President in explaining that the First Amendment does not prohibit all types of
content discrimination. The Court noted that all threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment, and that, just as Congress could choose to criminalize only those threats of violence
directed against the President because such threats "have special force when applied to the
President," the states could choose to single out cross burning, as opposed to all intimidating
messages, in light of its long history as a signal of impending violence. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549.
269. Id. at 1547.
270. Id. at 1548.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
273. Id.
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death. '27 4 Cross burning involves intimidation if it is "intended to create
a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence. 275
Thus, cross burning is proscribable as a true threat where it is done
with the intention of intimidating. Where, however, cross burning is not
done to intimidate, but is used, for example, as a statement of ideology,
a symbol of group solidarity, or a ritual at Klan gatherings to represent
the Klan itself, its use is protected under the First Amendment, even
where the effect of the cross burning is to intimidate.276 In Part IV of its
Black decision, the Court concludes that the prima facie provision fails
to distinguish among these different types of cross burnings, and is thus
unconstitutional because it can "'skew jury deliberations toward convic-
tions in cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively
weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for burn-
ing.' ,,277 The Court concludes that the "First Amendment does not per-
mit such a short cut. 2
78
Justice O'Connor's plurality decision relies on two separate majori-
ties of the Court to reach its result, and on separate concurrences from
justices dissenting as to other parts of the opinion. The ultimate out-
come, however, is clear: One cluster of six justices - Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Breyer, and Thomas - found
that cross burning could be proscribed. A separate cluster of seven jus-
tices -Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Stevens, Breyer, Souter, Gins-
berg, and Kennedy - found unconstitutional an evidentiary standard
under which the act of cross burning was prima facie proof of intent to
intimidate. Thus, seven justices, a substantial majority of the court,
agreed that intent to intimidate cannot be inferred from the act of cross
burning alone. Rather, whether a particular cross burning constituted a
true threat depends on the facts of the case. Only the most conservative
justices on the Court, Scalia and Thomas, would have upheld the prima
facie evidence provision.279
Although Virginia v. Black did not involve threats to government
officials, it has important implications for the application of the true
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1551
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Justice Scalia argues in his dissent that the prima facie evidence provision is not
inconsistent with the First Amendment because it does not preclude a finding by the jury that the
speech was protected. Rather, the prima facie provision allows evidence of the cross burning to
raise a presumption of fact that can be rebutted by the defendants with evidence to the contrary.
Id. at 1552-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted above, Justice Souter argues that this presumption
would allow for conviction where the "evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak, and
consistent with an ideological basis for the burning." Id. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring).
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threat doctrine in these cases as well. Black also calls into question the
application of the objective, reasonable person standards applied by
lower courts. In reaching its decision, the Court appeared to be reaffirm-
ing the high standard set forth in Watts v. United States for determining
what constitutes a true threat. Furthermore, noting that all threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment, the Court indicates, by way
of example, that Congress could have chosen to criminalize only those
threats directed against the President "since the reason why threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when
applied to the President."28 The Court uses this argument to support its
position that a state can criminalize "cross burning" without criminaliz-
ing all forms of intimidating speech. The use of this particular example,
rather than suggesting a different legal standard for judging threats
against the President, underscores the Court's position that the First
Amendment permits the government to ban only a true threat. By
rejecting a primafacie standard for finding intent to intimidate, based on
the act of cross burning alone, the Court suggested that the government
has the burden of proving that an intimidating act was intended to intim-
idate in order to be proscribable as a true threat.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
On July 21, 2003, when the Secret Service investigated Pulitzer
Prize-winning cartoonist Michael Ramirez because of the cartoon he
published the day before in the Los Angeles Times, the federal govern-
ment demonstrated that it truly lacked a sense of humor. Ironically,
Ramirez did not intend his cartoon to be an attack on George W. Bush,
but rather, an attack on Bush's detractors. Bush's would-be executioner,
who resembled South Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, wore a
shirt with the word "Politics." The cartoon was a scathing attack on
those who sought to exploit the situation in Iraq to attack the character
of the President, but the image of a foreign individual holding a gun to
the Bush caricature's head was enough to trigger a Secret Service inves-
tigation. Representative Christopher Cox, the Republican chair of the
House Homeland Security Committee, remarked that the use of "federal
power to attempt to influence the work of a political cartoonist for the
Los Angeles Times reflects profoundly bad judgment."'28' Cox
demanded an apology and a promise that this would not happen again.
282
As disturbing as this incident must have been for Ramirez and
national news organizations across the country, the incident is important
280. Id. at 1549.
281. Cartoon Prompts Inquiry, supra note 24.
282. Id.
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in drawing attention to how broad the powers of the Secret Service have
become to investigate perceived threats. Furthermore, implicit in the
above incidents is the message that if one engages in speech that attacks
the President or other members of his Administration, the federal gov-
ernment will wield a heavy hand. The government's response to Glenn
Given's editorial in the Stonybrook Press would seem to indicate an
attempt by the government to label this form of political satire as a true
threat. Similarly, its response to A.J. Brown's "Wanted" poster is
equally disturbing. In both cases, the Secret Service was dispatched to
determine whether these forms of expression constituted a true threat to
the President.
It is conceivable that the Secret Service agents were relying on mis-
information when they investigated Given, Brown, John Fischer, and
Jesse Ethredge, or that they felt it was necessary to ensure that none of
the targets of its investigations posed an actual threat to the President.
The investigation of Michael Ramirez, however, hints at a more omi-
nous motive. It underscores a pattern or practice of investigating indi-
viduals engaged in speech critical of the government for purposes of
chilling that speech. Ironically, in the case of Ramirez, the Secret Ser-
vice apparently did not even understand his cartoon, which was intended
to be supportive of the Administration. Or perhaps it wanted to send a
message to cartoonists and commentators everywhere not to engage in
speech that satirizes or caricatures the current Administration. The
White House's heavy-handed reaction to John Wooden's parody of
Lynn Cheney only underscores such a motive.
The First Amendment enshrines the right to criticize government
officials and those in the public eye. When Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell was before the Supreme Court, many journalists and political
cartoonists warned that a decision in Falwell's favor would have a dan-
gerous chilling effect on "editorialists, cartoonists, commentators, and
comedians - in fact all those in the business of expressing their opinion
about public figures." '283 Historically, political satire has been a power-
ful vehicle for social criticism, often used by socially and politically
marginalized groups. It is a literary device designed to ridicule or cen-
sure social and political abuses, and those in the public spotlight. It is
often justified by those who employ it as serving a corrective role. It
seeks to expose vice and hypocrisy in the hopes that the satirist's barbs
will either sufficiently embarrass the target to recognize his or her vice
and correct it, or cause the audience to recognize the need for social
change.
Thus, recent efforts by the federal government to chill the speech of
283. See Reporters Committee Brief, supra note 74, at 6.
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political cartoonists and satirists are particularly disturbing. Part H dis-
cussed recent surveys by the Freedom Forum's First Amendment
Center, which indicated that while in the abstract the public supports the
rights guaranteed in the First Amendment, nearly half of those surveyed
believed that the First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guaran-
ties. 84 Another survey indicated that a significant percentage of Ameri-
cans appear less willing to tolerate humor that they consider
offensive. 285 The Report concludes that people appear to be willing to
"give up a little liberty in exchange for fewer hurt feelings. 286
Schauer argues that "there seems little doubt that the views of con-
temporary juries in cases involving the claims of public officials and
public figures against the press are in fact a roughly accurate mirror of
the views of the population." '287 If this is the case, then the above survey
would tend to support the view of many proponents of the First Amend-
ment that giving juries greater decisional power in free speech cases
would deal a crippling blow to the First Amendment. Yet Schauer also
argues that "by removing majorities from any meaningful input into the
consideration of free speech issues, we run the risk that those majorities
will cease to see free speech as something they ought to care about. 28 8
He also argues that we cannot rely on notions of popular sovereignty
while restricting the people's ability to make important decisions about
how our leaders will be controlled.289
In true threat cases, judges should retain the power and responsibil-
ity to decide whether there is sufficient evidence of a subjective intent to
threaten. I would call, however, for a standard of conditional relevancy
derived from Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that would send
such questions to the jury once the judge makes the initial determination
of sufficiency.2 90 Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
that preliminary questions, such as those concerning the admissibility of
evidence, shall be determined by the court.29' Section (b) of Rule 104
sets forth the standard for conditional relevancy. It provides that
"[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends on the fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condi-
284. See State of the First Amendment 2002, supra note 49, at 22.
285. See Comedy and Freedom of Speech, supra note 55, at 8.
286. Id. at 2.
287. Schauer, supra note 7, at 768.
288. Id. at 783.
289. Id. at 782.
290. See FED. R. EVID. 104.
291. Id. at 104(a).
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tion.' '292 Such a standard is similar to the approach used by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Kelner2 93 and reaffirmed in United States v.
Francis,29 4 which held that in order to be a true threat, a statement must
be so "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the per-
son threatened as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect
of execution. '295  Using this modified standard, once the judge has
determined that sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find a subjective intent to threaten, the evidence would be submit-
ted to the jury. The jury would first determine whether the speaker had
a subjective intent to threaten, and then determine whether a reasonable
listener would have perceived the statement as a threat.2 96 Such a stan-
dard would balance the role of the judge and jury in such cases consis-
tent with the First Amendment, while ensuring that jurors continue to
play a meaningful role in serving as an essential check on unaccountable
government officials.
This Article has demonstrated that political satire and parody often
are important democratizing forces because they serve to engage the pol-
ity on some of the great social and political issues of our time. For this
reason, the recent investigations of individuals who embrace satirical
and outrageous speech suggest a major threat to freedom of expression.
It is important that the new Department of Homeland Security ensure
that, in light of the important First Amendment concerns at stake, Secret
Service agents are trained in threat assessment, which takes into account
the right to freedom of expression. The Secret Service's investigative
powers should not be used as a mechanism to chill speech critical of the
President or his Administration.
If presented with the question, the courts might choose to adopt a
contextual approach in distinguishing attacks on journalists from the
investigation of private individuals, which often present less clear-cut
cases. I would argue, however, that there is a danger in attempting to
distinguish political satire and political hyperbole in the print and broad-
cast media from satirical and hyperbolic statements by private individu-
als. Such an approach would undermine one of the corrective and
292. Id. at 104(b). See also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988); United
States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1371 (4th Cir. 1992).
293. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
294. 164 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999).
295. Id at 123.
296. In Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690, the Court indicated that the trial court should examine all
the evidence and decide whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact by a
preponderance. It also noted that the trial court could allow the evidence in but at a later point
decide whether sufficient evidence had been presented to permit the jury to make the requisite
finding. If the court found that the proponent had failed to meet this minimal standard, it could
instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. Id.
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progressive purposes of political satire, which is to educate and provoke
the polity to call for social and political change. Rather, the Supreme
Court, when given the opportunity, should reaffirm its speech-protective
holding in Watts and establish a legal standard consistent with Virginia
v. Black, which would require the government to prove a subjective
intent to threaten in order to establish a true threat. The Supreme Court
should also recognize the importance of the jury system in serving as a
popular check on abusive government practices that seek to chill speech,
including outrageous speech, critical of government officials and their
policies.
